In Julian Knight’s own words:
“I had wanted to enlist in the Army for as long as I can remember. From around the age of 12 my ambition was to emulate my father and become an officer in the Australian Army. During my school years my goal was to attend the Officer Cadet School (OCS), at Portsea.”
[SOURCE: Knight’s ‘Personal Account‘ (of Defence Abuse at Duntroon) to the D.A.R.T., 26th November 2013, p.2.]
Contrary to media premises and reported fantasies, Knight had NOT wanted to shoot innocent civilians for as long as he can remember.
In Julian Knight’s own words:
“I do not consider my failure to graduate from RMC Duntroon as a case of “should have been” more so a case of “could have been”.
One aspect of the training that became ingrained in me was the notion of “command responsibility”. In line with this notion, I consider that the ultimate responsibility for my failure at Duntroon rests with me. I am not blind to my own character defects and other personal failings that contributed to my failure to succeed at the college.
After many years reflection, and attempting to be as objective as possible, I believe that I would have graduated with the rest of my Class in June 1988. I believe that had I survived a further 16 days (until the 1st Class had graduated and I progressed to 2nd Class), I would have settled into life at the college and improved both my morale and my performance. I think this is especially so given that I had made the decision in mid-May 1987 to make a concerted effort to change around what had been until then poor or average performance. It is stating the obvious to say that a prediction based on what “might have been” is speculative at best. My best guess is that I would have graduated towards the bottom third of the Class. Given my lack of ambition, I also expect that I would not have risen beyond the rank of Major.”
[SOURCE: Knight’s ‘Personal Account‘ (of Defence Abuse at Duntroon) to the D.A.R.T., 26th November 2013, p.2.]
Analysis by a witness:
- Knight here some years later, having time to reflect in prison, recognises that his graduation from RMC was dependent upon his performance or lack thereof. His failure to graduate was not a foregone conclusion because he was accepted into RMC after a rigorous selection process as has having a good chance of graduating. Having said that, it was made aware to applicants at the time for this particular intake in January 1987, that RMC numbers were down and so the Army leadership had decided to slightly lower the thresholds of standards required of applicants so that it could boost numbers to 500 and then rely upon culling poor achievers on campus – relying upon the ‘weeding out’ of unsuitable junior Third Class (freshman) by bastardisation practices metered out by the senior cadets.
- The particular cohort of senior cadets in Kokoda Company at the time of this six monthly intake of January 1987 was observably antagonistic and sadistic toward junior cadets to the point of behaviour emulating Brownshirt Nazi youth. Those violent abusers (in barracks criminals) documented by Knight in his law suit against Duntroon [Knight v Commonwealth of Australia (no 3) [2017] ACTSC 3] were senior cadet bullying bastards:
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- Warrant Officer Class 2 Seigfreid REMIN
- Kokoda Drill Sergeant C.A. JORGENSEN
- Philip John REED (CSC No 4592)
- Craig Colis THORP (CSC No 5133)
- William YATES (CSC No 5148)
- Matthew THOMPSON (CSC No 5132)
- Robert HAMBURGER (CSC No 4548)
- Nicholas EVERINGHAM (CSC No 4823)
- Dale BURNSIDE (CSC No 4775)
- James MUNTZ (CSC No 4876)
- Is it no wonder that after Knight was subjected to multiple instances of physical assault by these men that Knight felt it necessary to start carrying self-protection?
- The notion of ‘command responsibility’ was not inculcated at RMC. Kokoda Company Commanding Officer at the time, Major Todd Verco, was rarely seen in barracks and failed to take responsibility for the criminal behaviour of the senior cadets toward the junior cadets. On one occasion, this author complained directly to MAJ VERCO in response to his questioning the company in barracks if any cadet had any issues. One raised the issue of bogging into the early hours by numerous Third Class cadets that was resulting in many falling asleep during lectures.
- Knight is self-deprecating here, blaming his own character defects and other personal failings that contributed to his failure to succeed at the college. He is being unfairly harsh on himself, and choosing to not holding the bastardisation torment that was a in a large way responsible for his inability to meet training demands.
- It is likely that once Knight had ‘survived’ the intense targeting in Third Class and advanced to Second Class (16 days after the Private Bin incident) that he would have settled into life at the college and improved both his morale and performance.
- Knight’s speculation that presuming he had graduated from RMC, and given that his primary interests lay in executing Infantry combat operations moreso that combat leadership that his ultimate rank would have been not beyond the rank of Major.
Knight’s Past Alternatives?
So what would have been Knight’s past alternatives to entry into RMC Duntroon, and thus Hoddle Street never happening?
Army denied Knight unadulterated officer training at ‘OCS Portsea’:
On 4th March 1986, Knight had turned 18 years of age. OCS was conveniently just south of Melbourne in Victoria, Knight’s home city where he lived, grew up, went to school and where his family and friends lived. Whereas the Royal Military College was located interstate in distant Canberra and with a culture unknown to him.
OCS for decades had built a reputation as the superior (unadulterated/no crap) pure training reputation for developing robust and real platoon leaders. This was especially highly regarded by local Victorians. Knight would have excelled in such a direct training environment without the bullying. He just wanted to do the job – soldiering and being trained to lead soldiers starting at platoon level junior commander at OCS.
However, in December 1985 the Australian Army’s only alternative Officer Cadet School (OCS) at Portsea had been mothballed by the ADF Brass in Canberra as part of its politically driven restructuring programme to consolidate the officer training across Army/Navy/Air Force for cost-cutting reasons, but moreso centralising control of officer training by the ADF boffins in Canberra to Canberra.
The date of OCS’s closure is poignant in hindsight, since the timing was co-incidentally just three months before Knight’s 18th birthday. Had the mothballing been just a year later, Knight would have most certainly been accepted into his preferred Victorian OCS instead of distant Canberra’s RMC. The subsequent history would have been a lot different – most notably, no Hoddle Street shootings for starters!
Given that Army officer admission age was/is between 18 and 23, Knight’s first opportunity to apply was once he turned 18 (4th March 1986). However, by March 1986, the cut-off date to start to apply for Duntroon’s six monthly intake round of June 1986 had lapsed.
This meant that Knight’s first opportunity to apply for Army officer training was for the January 1987 intake, which he did so on 30th July 1986. He proceeded to go through the normal series of Army tests and interviews for his suitability, and successfully on 16th October 1986, the RMC Selection Board formally notified Knight of his acceptance into the Royal Military College for the January 1987 intake.
Now, with the benefit of hindsight, what if 18-y.o. Julian Knight back in 1986 prior to him applying for entry into RMC Duntroon, had been aware of RMC’s sadistic bastardisation culture, of his likely conflict with such a sick culture to his larrikin character, and so been given cause to reflect on other career options in the Army?
With the benefit of hindsight, we posit the following realistic scenarios of what would probably have been Knight’s Alternative Paths:
Knight’s Alternative Outcome ‘A’ – him returning back to his Army Reserve unit
In the possible alternative scenario that Knight’s application to RMC Duntroon in late 1986 had failed the Army’s Selection Board approval, Knight could have returned in 1987 to his involvement in part-time training and service as an Army Reservist in the Infantry with his unit the 4th/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment (Armoured Personnel Carriers).
This would have been likely, given that his application to RMC had not required him to first resign from his role in the Army Reserve. Application to RMC was/is just an option. Rejection by the RMC Selection Board is not a reflection of any candidate’s lack of potential ‘officer material‘ ability/aptitude/fitness/motivation/leadership potential, etc .
Indeed, many candidates have gone on to re-apply again to RMC and become successful. For example, Knight’s training colleague, Staff Cadet Ridd, was finally accepted into RMC in the same January 1987 intake following three previous unsuccessful applications – (1) the January 1983 intake, (2) the July 1983 intake and (3) the January 1984 intake. Staff Cadet Ridd explained to Knight that he had been rejected on the first two applications due to Selection Board reasons citing immaturity. Ridd’s third application was rejected due to the Selection Board’s false perception that Ridd was backbacking and working on luxury Hayman Island resort at the time, so not cut out for Army life. Ridd explained that the Selection Board had not taken into account his daily 11 km run around the island’s then goat track perimeter to build his fitness and his commitment to join (3rd application) – such was the sheltered workshop mindset of the RMC Selection Board.
Knight’s Alternative Outcome ‘B’ – him making further applications to RMC
Knight’s unwavering career aim since a childhood ‘impressionable age‘/ ‘formative years‘ (7-12) was headlong to be like his role model mentoring father, Army Captain Ralph Knight.
Moreso, as Knight grew through his teens, his Army-related training experience focused his ambition towards becoming a professional Infantry Soldier; whereas his father was an Army administrative education officer, not involved in combat roles. Read more about Knight’s commitment to serve on this website.
Knight’s only option for Army officer training was via RMC Duntroon. It would have been probable that Knight would have reapplied for RMC at the next opportunity. That would have been for the next intake in July 1987.
However, there are no public records that can be found to indicate that RMC’s institutionalised bastardisation culture by senior cadets toward junior (freshmen) cadets was to change in the decade following 1987. The first such indication came in 1998 from media reporting of the ADF’s internal ‘Report of the Review into Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy‘ by Bronwyn Grey (The Grey Report) – but since withdrawn from public access.
Knight turned 19 in March 1987, so still a young age by RMC standards, given applicant eligibility age range between 18 and 23. For young men particularly, there is typically a notable difference in emotional and social maturity (self-confidence/innocence/worldliness) from age 18 to 23.
So, by the July 1987 intake (just six months later), Knight in a second hypothetical application to RMC, would likely have shown few trait differences in Knight. By then he would have likely continued to serve part-time with his familiar Reservist unit, whilst at the same dedicating most of his focus toward passing his selection approval into RMC in the months leading up to the July 1987 intake. So an Alternative Outcome ‘B1‘ for all intensive purposes.
Similarly, if he had re-applied aged 19 for a third time for the January 1988 intake (‘B2‘), and if failed, re-applied aged 20 for a third time for the July 1988 intake (‘B3‘), and if failed, re-applied aged 20 for a fourth time for the January 1989 intake (‘B4‘), and if failed, re-applied aged 21 for a fifth time for the July 1989 intake (‘B5‘), and if failed, re-applied aged 21 for a sixth time for the January 1990 (‘B6‘) – likely few differences with Knight (except more advanced skills and maturity).
However, as mentioned from the RMC side, there are no public records that can be found to indicate that RMC’s institutionalised bastardisation culture by senior cadets toward junior (freshmen) cadets was to change in the decade following 1987. Thus, there is nothing to indicate any different an outcome for Knight from his January 1987 intake. Same shit, different senior cadets, different intake.
It is reasonably unlikely that Knight for have attempted more that say four re-applications to RMC. There would have had to have been a serious reason for such a repeated rejection of his applications by the RMC Selection Board beyond the argument of ‘immaturity’ after he had reached the age of 21.
Of course this is all conjecture. Yet the unchanged Duntroon Bastardisation culture causing psychotic trauma is the message here, such that Hoddle Street might instead have been committed after 1987.
Knight’s Alternative Outcomes ‘C’ – him enlisting with Army Regulars (non-Commissioned)
Given Knight’s training and skills, pre-Duntroon, he could likely have been accepted into the Army Regular Army and so served on a full time basis, and advanced through the NCO ranks.
This Army career direction would have provided a number of advancement opportunities for Knight (perhaps moreso than via RMC) subject to his interests, ability, and him passing prescribed training courses along the way.
Advanced field options would be across the various Army Corps (his most preferred being Infantry (Royal Australian Regiment), and undertake specialist training such as the RAR’s Basic Sniper Course, Special Forces Accelerated Infantry Training Programme (6-weeks), Commando Selection and Training Course (11 -weeks), mechanised cavalry, Commandos, even the Special Air Service, if asked.
We shall never know.
A career-smart Australian soldier’s alternative career pathway to avoid RMC Duntroon Bastardisation
From experience, we recommend for aspiring serious career soldiers to avoid the RMC Duntroon option like the bloody plague!
If Army is your ambition, try first with the Australian Army Reserves from age 18 and allow some years to re-evaluate your corps and career advancement options. Don’t be hoodwinked on some highfalutin fantasy spin of Army ‘officer material’ crap from Army propaganda and its Recruitment Centres.
Here’s one serious advanced option later on for those still young, Infantry experienced, supremely fit, strong and qualified male-only soldiers:
The French Foreign Legion
Men only between the ages of 17 and 40, of any nationality, may join the Legion. We see no evidence or reporting of bastardisation in the Legion – just the toughest of Infantry training to Commando standard. But the Legion does not do bastardisation – all recruits are of the same class. There are no senior cadets and junior cadets like at Duntroon. Instead there are only instructors and cadets.
But to stand any hope in hell of being accepted into the Legion let alone graduating, first read up and watch these official introductory videos we provide below. Then reflect on the years of prior preparation required, and also wisely consider your other career options beforehand.
Still interested?
And search Google YouTube for more info. Don’t be naive.
Best to first prepare young (from age 7) by learning to swim, (from aged 10) cross-country running, then (from age 15) do daily gym weight training to build your physique. Don’t eat junk food – educate yourself about healthy balanced and high protein food, not fake steroid shit.
Join the school Army Cadets, learn basic French to conversational level. Take a 3-year gap travelling through rural France to learn fluent French, hire a personal trainer to become a strong a fit as you possibly can – legs and upper bodily strength to gymnast standard. Then return and join up with the Australian Army, first as Reservist in the Infantry. Opt for learing a complementary trade whilst serving – as a backup for future options.
Then if you’re still keen after a few years, apply to be a Regular Army soldier for minimum 3 years. Do the basic training. Then do extra training available when you know you’re ready. Don’t risk failing by taking on stuff you are not 100% confident with. Gain your skills, certifications, etc.
Only then consider applying for the Legion, but read up first.
But avoid Duntroon like the plague. If you want to lead a corporation ultimately, avoid Duntroon like the plague.
Read about past successful soldiers, like Albert Jacka, VC | Jerry Michael Shriver…
Julian Knight’s Conclusion RE: Duntroon
“I do not consider my failure to graduate from RMC Duntroon as a case of “should have been” more so a case of “could have been”.
One aspect of the training that became ingrained in me was the notion of “command responsibility”. In line with this notion, I consider that the ultimate responsibility for my failure at Duntroon rests with me. I am not blind to my own character defects and other personal failings that contributed to my failure to succeed at the college.
After many years reflection, and attempting to be as objective as possible, I believe that I would have graduated with the rest of my Class in June 1988. I believe that had I survived a further 16 days (until the 1st Class had graduated and I progressed to 2nd Class), I would have settled into life at the college and improved both my morale and my performance. I think this is especially so given that I had made the decision in mid-May 1987 to make a concerted effort to change around what had been until then poor or average performance. It is stating the obvious to say that a prediction based on what “might have been” is speculative at best. My best guess is that I would have graduated towards the bottom third of the Class. Given my lack of ambition, I also expect that I would not have risen beyond the rank of major.
Reviewing my service history as far back as the Boy Scouts, it is apparent that my performance tended to fall at either end of the spectrum: I either performed at the top of the class or failed miserably (often combined with disciplinary action).
Neuropsychological testing and academic results since my imprisonment have tended to show that the Selection Board assessments of my intellectual and academic potential were underrated. It could be said that by “playing the fool” people tended to think I was one.
In February 1988, after neuropsychological testing with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R) in November 1987, I was assessed as having a full scale IQ of 132 (placing me in the top 2.2% of the population).”
Disclaimer: This website has no connection with the French Foreign Legion. This author attempted to join up in his youth (aged 17) but his mother refused to sign the application form – so probably why he is still around to write this article.